The basic idea of program evaluation is both simple and appealing. Program outcomes are measured and compared to some minimum performance standard or threshold. In practice, however, evaluation is quite difficult. Two fundamental problems of outcome measurement must be addressed. The first, which we call the problem of auxiliary outcomes, is that we do not observe outcome of interest. The second, which we call the problem of counterfactual outcomes, is that we do not observe the threshold standard. This paper examines how performance standards should be set and applied in the face of these problems in measuring outcomes. In particular, we consider the problem of evaluating the new World Bank sponsored Quality of Undergraduate Education (QUE) program. This competitive block grant program is to be judged by the program's effects on student outcomes, not by the particular ways in which the grantee departments use their funds. Our central message is that the proper way to implement standards varies with the prior information that the evaluator can credibly bring to bear to compensate for incomplete outcome data. An evaluator, confronted with the auxiliary and counterfactual outcomes problems, should combine the available data with credible assumptions on treatments and outcomes. Given this information, the performance of a program may be deemed acceptable, unacceptable or indeterminate.
Introduction
The Quality of Undergraduate Education (QUE) program was recently initiated by the Indonesian government's Board of Higher Education (BHE) as a component of a portfolio of educational programs supported by the World Bank. As part of this program, competitive proposals for block grants to improve the quality of undergraduate education in specific fields were solicited from academic departments across the country. In August 1997, 16 five-year grants were awarded with funding levels averaging 400,000 U.S. dollars per year. By agreement between the BHE and the World Bank, the performance of the QUE program is to be judged by the program's effects on student outcomes, not by the particular ways in which the grantee departments use their funds.
Agencies operating social programs often use performance standards to evaluate success in achieving outcomes of interest (e.g., see Cave and Hanney, 1992) . Program outcomes are measured and compared with the standard, a threshold deemed to separate acceptable outcomes from unacceptable ones. An evaluation using a performance standard should specify not only the threshold to be used but also the action to be taken if outcomes do not meet the threshold. Discussions of performance standards are often disappointingly vague about this critical matter. However the idea usually seems to be that the threshold should be set equal to an outcome level thought achievable by some alternative, perhaps a change in the management of the program being evaluated or perhaps an entirely different program. Then a possible action is to replace the program being evaluated with the alternative if the program yields an outcome below the threshold.
Consider the problem of evaluating the QUE program in 2002. The outcome of interest to the BHE is, broadly speaking, the value to Indonesian society of having high quality university graduates. The threshold might be set as the outcome that would be expected under the baseline non-competitive grant scheme. To cast this idea in conventional economic terms, we might interpret the BHE as wanting to determine whether Keynes (1921) and Knight (1921) to Walley (1991) , decision theorists have long struggled to credibly deal with the ambiguity inherent in program evaluations and decision making. No method of resolving ambiguity (e.g., the maximin rule (Wald, 1950) and Bayesian decision rules (Berger, 1985; Spencer, 1985, Spencer and Mosses, 1990) ) can ensure that expected outcomes are maximized. In this paper, we analyze the implications of indeterminacy which arises from two fundamental identification problems; the auxiliary and counterfactual outcome problems. While these two concerns are central, they certainly do not exhaust the set of possible causes of ambiguity. For a general discussion, see Manski (1999). data. Of course, the assumptions an evaluator is willing to impose may vary from case to case. If this prior information is sufficiently strong, the traditional practice of using a single threshold to separate acceptable outcomes from unacceptable ones is appropriate. An evaluator having weaker prior information however, should set two thresholds rather than one. The performance of the program should be deemed acceptable if the observed auxiliary outcomes meet the higher acceptance threshold and unacceptable if they fall below the lower nonacceptance threshold.
If the auxiliary outcomes lie between these two thresholds, the performance of the program is indeterminate. In this case, there is insufficient basis for deciding whether the program being evaluated should be continued or replaced by the alternative. Decisions to continue the program or to replace it are both defensible given the available information. Efforts to obtain more information before making a decision may be justified. 1 We develop these ideas in two stages. Sections 2 and 3 consider the evaluation problem in some generality. Section 2 formalizes basic concepts: treatments, outcomes, programs, and treatment effects.
Section 3 uses these concepts to address the problems of auxiliary outcomes and counterfactual outcomes respectively. These sections aim to make general points, so some of the discussion is necessarily abstract.
In Sections 4 through 6, we shift from generalities to the specifics involved in evaluating the new World Bank sponsored Quality of Undergraduate Education (QUE) program. Section 4 describes the QUE program, which awards competitive five-year block grants to university departments to improve the quality of their undergraduate curricula. Sections 5 and 6 examine two distinct ways in which performance standards 4 2 A similar distinction is made in the literature on evaluating personnel, where both a particular job as well as the individuals who hold the job may be evaluated (Lazear, 1995, Chapter 8) . 3 Supposing that the outcome-of-interest is scalar does not rule out the possibility that a person experiences multiple outcomes following treatment. The outcome-of-interest transforms these multiple outcomes into a single measure that expresses the overall value of the treatment.
will be used. In the short run, the progress of QUE grantees in achieving specified auxiliary outcome targets will be monitored. Then, at the end of the five-year grant period, the QUE program as a whole will be evaluated.
QUE is representative of a large class of programs that use block grants and similar decentralized decision making mechanisms to achieve social objectives. Our examination of the QUE program has lessons for the evaluation of other block grant programs. In particular, the analysis of Section 6 shows the need for integrated micro evaluation of particular grantees and macro evaluation of the program as a whole. 
Concepts of Formal Evaluation
The usual formalization of a program evaluation assumes that each member j of a population J receives one of several mutually exclusive and exhaustive treatments. Each member of this population experiences a scalar outcome-of-interest that may depend on the treatment received. The possible treatments will be numbered t = 1,...,T. The outcomes associated with these treatments are y(t), t = 1,...,T.
3
The treatment that a person receives depends on the set of treatments available to this person and on the person's choice of a treatment from this set. Social programs help determine the set of available 5 4 Of course, one might consider evaluating other features of the distribution of outcomes. See, for example, Manski (1995; 1997b) and Heckman, Smith and Clements (1997). treatments and thus influence the treatments that people receive. It will suffice to consider two programs.
One of these is the operational program being evaluated, labeled program A here. The other is the alternative with which the operational program is to be compared, labeled program B. Let z jA 0 T indicate the treatment that person j actually receives under program A, and let z jB 0 T indicate the treatment that this person would receive under program B. Then the outcomes this person does experience under program A and would experience under program B are y(z jA ) and y(z jB ) respectively.
The objective of the evaluation is to determine which yields the better outcomes, program A or B.
The usual practice is to compare programs in terms of their mean outcomes across the population. In conventional economic terms, we assume that the planner wants to maximize a utilitarian social welfare function.
4 Let E[y(z A )] and E[y(z B )] denote the mean outcomes under programs A and B. The quantity
is the average treatment effect of program A relative to program B. If *(A, B) is positive, the performance of program A may be deemed acceptable. Thus the mean outcome of program B provides the threshold relative to which program A's outcomes are judged.
Implementing the performance standard is straightforward if the evaluator observes the outcomes y(z A ) and y(z B ) of the members of the population, or at least those of random samples of the population. Then the evaluator may learn the mean outcomes E[y(z A )] and E[y(z B )] and determine whether the former exceeds the latter.
Our concern is with evaluation in the absence of complete outcome data. The problem of auxiliary outcomes arises when the evaluator observes a vector of auxiliary outcomes of program A, say w(z A ), but not the outcome-of-interest y(z A ). The problem of counterfactual outcomes is that, program B not being in operation, its outcomes are unobservable in principle.
To illustrate these concepts, consider the problem of evaluating the QUE program. In this case, the set T of possible treatments may index different types of funding mechanisms; university funding might vary by the allocation scheme (competitive versus non-competitive), the levels and types of assistance, the restrictions on inputs and outputs, and the criteria for future funding. Program A may be some version of the competitive block grant funding introduced by the QUE program, and program B may be the baseline noncompetitive allocation system. The outcome-of-interest y may measure life-time earnings. The observed auxiliary outcomes w might measure cognitive ability in year 2002.
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The performance of the QUE program may be deemed acceptable if mean present discounted value of life-time earnings is higher under the QUE program than under the baseline alternative. The problem of auxiliary outcomes is that only cognitive status is observed under the operational program. The problem of counterfactual outcomes is that no outcome measurements at all are possible under the counterfactual alternative to program A.
Problems of Outcome Measurement
In this section, we provide a general introduction to the problems of auxiliary and counterfactual outcomes. In Section 3.1 we investigate the problem of auxiliary outcomes and offer two possible solutions, 7 both of which rely on historical data. Abstracting from the problem of counterfactual outcomes, we suppose that the evaluator sets a threshold that the mean outcome of program A must meet to be deemed acceptable.
Then, in Section 3.2 we examine how this threshold is determined. In particular, we describe the problem of counterfactual outcomes, and review some of the possible solutions to this problem.
The Problem of Auxiliary Outcomes
Abstracting from the problem of counterfactual outcomes, let c denote the threshold set by the evaluator. Then the criterion for judging the performance of program A is this:
The evaluator observes only the auxiliary outcomes w(z A ) of the population and not their outcomesof-interest y(z A ). The problem is to use the data on auxiliary outcomes to learn about E[y(z A )]. For convenience, suppose that the auxiliary outcome vector w can take S possible values, numbered s = 1,...,S.
Use the law of iterated expectations to write
Here E[y(z A )*w(z A ) = s] is the mean value of the outcome-of-interest among the people who realize value Treatments and covariates can serve as auxiliary outcomes. To formalize treatment as an auxiliary outcome, we simply define w(z A ) / z A . A covariate -e.g., race or sex -is simply an auxiliary outcome whose value varies across the population but not across treatments; that is, w(z A ) does not vary with z A . Thus treatments and covariates are two polar forms of auxiliary outcomes. the historical data yield an unbiased conditional forecast:
This equal-conditional-means assumption and the law of iterated expectations (3) yield
By assumption (4), the historical data on (w, y) reveal E H (y*w = s) whenever P[w(z A (5) to learn E[y(z A )] and so judge the performance of program A.
The credibility of the equal-conditional-means assumption must be assessed on a case-by-case basis.
The identity of the measured auxiliary outcomes may be critical, the assumption being credible for some specifications of the auxiliary outcomes but not for others. Often, planners choose auxiliary outcome measures which are arguably related to both the intervention and the outcome of interest. 7 There are, however, no general criteria for ensuring the credibility of the assumption.
For the QUE program, the BHE has agreed to collect data on at least seven auxiliary outcomes, many of which measure cognitive skills. The equal-conditional-means assumption states that the unobserved mean Here " and ß are constants such that 0 # " # ß # 4. These constants, specified by the evaluator, express the strength of the association that the evaluator feels comfortable asserting between E H (y*w = s) and
If " = ß = 1, we have the equal-conditional-means assumption. If " = 0 and ß = 4,
Assumption (6) and the law of iterated expectations (3) imply this bound on E[y(z A )]:
As we do here, the literature on sensitivity analysis (see, for example, Cornfield et. al., (1959) , Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) and Rosenbaum (1995, Chapter 4) ) examines the implications of varying certain unknown constants or parameters within some class of models. This literature, however, does not address the evaluator's problem of making decisions when the findings are ambiguous. That is, if " < ( < $, the performance of A is indeterminate.
If the lower bound on E[y(z A )] meets the threshold c, the evaluator can conclude that the performance of program A is acceptable. If the upper bound on E[y(z A )] is less than c, he can conclude that the program's performance is unacceptable.
Many values of the constants " and ß will lead to a definitive evaluation. Let
From (7) we see that if " $ ( the program should be accepted and if ß # ( the program's performance is
unacceptable. An evaluator need only know that " or ß satisfy one of these inequalities to judge the efficacy of the program. Otherwise, the status of program A is indeterminate given the available data and prior information.
8
Consider the QUE program. There are many reasons why an evaluator may not be willing to make an equal-conditional-means assumption. It may be that schooling norms have changed between the historical period and the present, with consequent changes in the association between schooling and life-cycle earnings.
Or it may be that the very act of evaluating the QUE program has incentive effects that alter the association between cognitive skills and earnings. Administrators of the program, knowing that measured cognitive skills will be used to evaluate program performance, may choose to emphasize forms of schooling that have measurable effects on cognitive skills rather than ones whose effects become measurable later on. This is particularly true for manipulable indicators such as grade point average.
Concerned with these and other possibilities, the evaluator may find a bounded-conditional-means assumption to be more credible. If, for instance, performance indicators might be inflated due to the Hawthorne effect, the evaluator may want to assume (6) with " = 0 and ß = 1. 9 Whereas a variable v was originally called an instrumental variable if v has zero covariance with a residual , from the response function, the modern usage of the term has broadened to embrace assumptions that specified functions of v and , are orthogonal. Hence it is now necessary to specify the type of IV assumption one has in mind. Mean independence, quantile independence, and statistical independence assumptions (or the orthogonality conditions that these assumptions yield) have all been prominent in the literature. See Manski (1988) pp. 25-26 and Section 6.1 for discussion of the history and exposition of the variety of modern IV assumptions. the evaluator can credibly bring to bear.
The dominant concern of the econometric literature has been to predict the outcomes of mandatory treatment programs -ones giving the same treatment to all members of the population -when the available historical data pertain to an environment in which treatment varies across the population. In this context, the problem of counterfactual outcomes is known as the selection problem. Analyses of the selection problem show that if historical data on the outcome of interest are combined with sufficiently strong assumptions, the counterfactual mean outcome E[y(z B )] may be identified, implying a well-defined threshold for judging the performance of program A. In practice, the most common assumption is that treatments are statistically independent of outcomes in the historical data, as they would be in a classical randomized experiment. An alternative route to identification is to assert a parametric latent variable model jointly describing how treatments are selected and outcomes determined. Another alternative is to assume that treatment effects are constant across the population and that there exists some covariate, termed an instrumental variable, that is independent of outcomes but not of treatments.
9 See Björklund and Moffitt (1987) , Friedlander, Greenberg and Robins (1997) , Heckman and Honore (1990) , Heckman and Hotz (1989) , Heckman and Robb (1985) , Maddala (1983) , and Manski (1989 Manski ( , 1995 Manski (1990 Manski ( , 1994 , Manski and Pepper (2000) , Robins (1989) , and Robins and Greenland (1996) . Another set of results shows the identifying power of various assumptions about the treatment selection process when nothing is known about the process determining outcomes. For example, one may assume that each member of the population was assigned the treatment yielding the better outcome for that person. See Manski (1994 Manski ( , 1995 , and Manski and Nagin (1998) . Yet another set of results shows the identifying power of assumptions about the process determining outcomes when nothing is known about the treatment selection process. For example, one may assume that treatment response is monotone, in the sense that the outcome of one treatment is always at least as good as the outcome of the other. See Manski (1995 , 1997a .
When the available historical data and assumptions suffice to bound but not identify E[y(z B )], the conventional idea of using a single threshold to separate acceptable from unacceptable outcomes needs Otherwise, the performance of program A relative to B is indeterminate.
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The same considerations apply when the alternative program B does not mandate a single treatment but rather permits treatment to vary across the population (see Manski, 1997b and Pepper, 1999 It may be that the fixed-effects and comparison-group assumptions both have some plausibility, as do certain other assumptions, but that no one assumption stands out as clearly correct. In this situation, which we regard as likely in practice, the BHE should bring to bear all of the plausible assumptions, thus yielding a bound on E[y(z B )]. If there is concern about the credibility of certain assumptions but not others, the BHE might bound disagreements about the evaluation by estimating the expected counterfactual outcome under a sequence of progressively stronger assumptions. As assumptions are added, the bound on E[y(z B )] may narrow but may also be less credible.
The "Quality of Undergraduate Education" Program in Indonesia
In the remainder of the paper, we examine some of the specific issues involved in evaluating the QUE program. In this section, we describe the established features of the program and call attention to important unresolved questions. With this as background, Sections 5 and 6 examine the particular monitoring and evaluation problems associated with this program.
Basic Description of the QUE Program
With the assistance of the World Bank, the Government of Indonesia has embarked upon an effort to improve the quality of education through the greater use of incentives in budgetary allocation decisions. The general approach is to allocate some fraction of the development budget based on competitively awarded performance based grants. Under the old regime the allocation decisions were non-competitive.
The Quality of Undergraduate Education (QUE) program was recently initiated by the Indonesian government's Board of Higher Education (BHE) as a component of this effort. All academic departments
in public universities were invited to submit proposals for block grants to improve the quality of the undergraduate education they provide. The first round of the competition for these grants was carried out in 1997. Pre-proposals were received from 317 departments, 45 of which were invited to submit proposals.
In August 1997, 16 five-year grants were awarded with funding levels averaging 400,000 U.S. dollars per year. The grants are meant to provide new funding to the recipient departments, supplementing their regular budgets.
Departments submitting proposals were required to provide self-assessments of their strengths and weaknesses and to propose action plans detailing the use they would make of BHE funding. However the terms of the grants give recipients full discretion in the use of the new funds. By agreement between the BHE and the World Bank, the performance of the QUE program is to be judged by the program's effects on student outcomes, not by the particular ways in which the grantee departments use their funds.
The outcome of interest to the BHE is, broadly speaking, the value to Indonesian society of having high quality university graduates, both of the departments that receive QUE grants and of those which do not.
In practice, the BHE and the World Bank have agreed that the program will be first monitored and then evaluated using data to be collected on at least these seven auxiliary outcomes, which are officially termed performance indicators:
w1. NEE Score -average score of the department's students on the National Entrance Examination. (The NEE is used to admit students to departments.)
w2. GPA -average Grade Point Average of students enrolled in the department.
w3. TOEFL Score -average score on the Test of English as a Foreign Language, administered to graduating students.
w4. Time to Degree -average length of time that students are enrolled in the department en route to graduation.
w5. Time to Employment -average length of time that students take to secure employment following graduation.
w6. GRE Score -average score on the subject-area Graduate Record Examination, administered to graduating students.
w7. Peer Evaluation -a rating of department quality by international peer reviewers. targets is deemed to be inadequate, the BHE may take limited corrective actions depending on the particulars of the case. It may, for example, provide technical assistance to a department with inexperienced personnel.
Monitoring and Evaluation
It may also delay the release or reduce the size of a payment. The presumption, however, is that barring an incident of gross negligence or fraud, the grantee will continue to receive its annual funding throughout the five-year grant period. See Section 5 for further discussion.
Although monitoring has some of the character of an evaluation, the BHE usefully maintains a distinction between monitoring and the evaluation of the QUE program that will take place in 2002, when the BHE must decide whether to continue the QUE program or to replace it with an alternative. At this point, we need to confront the fact that the QUE program is a work in progress rather than a fully-articulated In Section 6, we select one version of the QUE program and one alternative for further study. In particular, we suppose that in 2002 the BHE will interpret the QUE program to use a performance-based grant renewal design, such that grantees would have their grants renewed for an additional five-year period if their measured auxiliary outcomes are judged to be acceptable, but not renewed if their auxiliary outcomes are judged non-acceptable. Every five years a new grant competition would be held to re-allocate those QUE funds that become available when some grantees do not have their grants renewed. 10 We suppose that the • Indefinite Funding -One interpretation of the QUE program is that the sixteen grants awarded in 1997 would be continued indefinitely, with no new grants being awarded to other departments.
• Open Re-competition -A second interpretation is that a new grant competition would be held every five years, all university departments being eligible to compete as in the initial competition in 1997. Present grantees would be eligible to submit new proposals but would enjoy no special status when the grants are re-competed.
It is easy enough to think of variations on these possibilities, as well as other options that become feasible if the funding level of the QUE program is itself considered variable.
11 There are numerous other alternatives. In fact, each definition of the QUE program implies different alternatives to QUE. Suppose, for example, that the BHE should interpret the QUE program to mean indefinite funding of the present grantees. Then the performance-based renewal design would provide an alternative to QUE. Other alternatives might retain the competitive funding idea of QUE but alter the number of grants or the award per grantee.
relevant alternative is the baseline non-competitive funding system used until 1997. 11 In the notation of Sections 2 and 3, performance based renewal QUE is program A and the baseline alternative is program B.
Performance-based renewal is a particularly interesting interpretation of QUE because it encompasses indefinite funding and open re-competition as special cases. If the threshold for grant renewal is set so low that all existing grants are renewed, performance-based renewal is equivalent to indefinite funding for the sixteen departments awarded grants in 1997. If the threshold is set so high that no existing grants are renewed, performance-based renewal is equivalent to open re-competition.
Monitoring The QUE Grantees
Grants from government agencies commonly carry provisions for monitoring grantees during the periods of their grants. Monitoring often focuses on matters of process --how the grant is managed, the nature of the expenditures made, etc. In contrast, the QUE program calls for monitoring certain outcomes 20 realized by grantees.
Each of the sixteen QUE grants specified target changes in performance indicators w1 through w5 to be achieved 2.5 years and five years after grant initiation. These midterm and final targets, which vary across the departments receiving grants, were established by negotiation between the BHE and the departments. These targets are conservative so that a non-positive report would indicate the need for some type of corrective action or additional supervision. The BHE has yet to determine how it will use the targets to assess departments' performance and the actions it will take if the target is not met. We consider the monitoring question here, restricting attention to the midterm targets. As will become evident in Section 6, evaluation of the QUE program at the end of five years involves distinct considerations.
Consider the situation of one QUE grantee, the Department of Civil Engineering at the University of Indonesia. Table 1 There are other assumptions that the BHE might want to bring to bear. It may, for example, be that the mean value of the outcome-of-interest varies monotonically with each of the five performance indicators.
In particular, the value of university graduates may be thought to be increasing in their test scores (w1, w2, w3) and decreasing in the times (w4, w5) required to obtain their degrees and find employment. Under this assumption, the BHE can conclude that midterm performance is acceptable ( Assumptions (A1) through (A4) greatly simplify the BHE's evaluation problem. We caution, however, that these assumptions should not be taken lightly. The BHE should, in principle, think beyond the next round of grants and so (A1) may not hold. University administrations may seek to use QUE funding to substitute for departmental baseline funding, thereby violating (A2). Moreover, the BHE may give QUE grants of different sizes to different departments, also violating (A2).
12 Assumption (A3) is plausible if relevant aspects of the higher education environment -the characteristics of university students, the mix of departments applying for QUE grants, the BHE's decision process in awarding grants, the state of the Indonesian labor market, etc. -do not change between 1997 and 2002. However changes in the environment may occur and make this assumption suspect. For example, the mix of departments applying for new QUE grants in 2002 may differ from the mix that applied in 1997.
As for Assumption (A4), there are several reasons why the QUE program may affect departments that do not receive grants. QUE funding may allow the departments that receive grants to compete more effectively for students, thus altering the student bodies at non-recipient departments. QUE funding may allow students in departments that receive grants to compete more effectively for a limited supply of jobs after graduation, thus altering the job prospects of the graduates of other departments. Moreover, the process of writing proposals for QUE funding may lead departments to critically appraise and improve their educational programs, even if they do not receive funding.
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With these caveats in mind, we lay out general features of the evaluation problem in Section 6.1 and then develop the implications of Assumptions (A1) through (A4) in Sections 6.2 and 6.3. In Section 6.2, we abstract from the problems of auxiliary and counterfactual outcomes and consider how the BHE should act if it were somehow to have complete outcome data. In Section 6.3, we consider how the BHE should act given the outcome data that are likely to be available.
General Features of the Evaluation Problem
Let us suppose that there is a population J of university departments in Indonesia. In general terms, the QUE program affects the funding of these departments. Abstracting from QUE, let F denote a program for funding university departments. The mean outcome of funding program F is
where *J* is the number of university departments. We shall interpret the BHE as wanting to choose a funding program that maximizes E[y j (F)].
By assumption, the feasible options are the performance-based renewal version of the QUE program and the baseline noncompetitive funding mechanism. In the notation of Sections 2 and 3, QUE is program A and the baseline alternative is program B. Applying equation (12), we suppose that the BHE would judge QUE to have acceptable outcomes if The term [16 -*J 21 *]·* 1 (A, B) on the right side of (18) (A, B) . This is accomplished by renewing the grants to departments whose outcomes are better than the group average * 1 (A, B) . Second, the BHE should continue the QUE program if the resulting value of * 2 (A, If the BHE, by combining extensive auxiliary outcome data and historical data with strong 28 assumptions, is able to infer the unobserved values of I j (A) and I j (B) for j 0 J 1 , then the two-stage decision process described in Section 6.2 can be implemented. It may well be, however, that the available data and assumptions only suffice to bound the values of I j (A) and I j (B), j 0 J 1 . Then, as described in Section 3, the BHE should retreat from the traditional idea of using a single threshold to separate acceptable outcomes from unacceptable ones.
Bounds on I j (A) and I j (B) for j 0 J 1 imply bounds on the group average outcome difference * 1 (A, B).
Taken together, the various bounds imply that Decision Stages 1 and 2 cannot be implemented in the simple manner of Section 6.2. Instead, each stage must allow the possibility that outcomes are judged acceptable, unacceptable, or indeterminate.
In the micro-evaluations of Stage 1, the performance of each department j 0 J 1 might be judged acceptable if its predicted outcomes meet a high acceptance threshold, determined by applying the lower bound on I j (A), the upper bound on I j (B), and the upper bound on * 1 (A, B). Similarly, department j's performance might be judged unacceptable if its predicted outcomes fail to meet a low nonacceptance threshold, determined by applying the upper bound on I j (A), the lower bound on I j (B), and the lower bound on * 1 (A, B) . If the predicted outcomes lie between the two thresholds, then the acceptability of department j's outcomes is indeterminate and the BHE must use some auxiliary rule to decide whether this department should have its QUE grant renewed.
Bounds on the performances of individual departments aggregate into bounds on the performance of the QUE program as a whole in the macro-evaluation of Stage 2. The mechanics of aggregating the micro-level bounds may be somewhat complex but the underlying idea is simple enough. The performancebased renewal version of the QUE program should be judged acceptable if the lower bound on its predicted outcomes is sufficiently high and unacceptable if the upper bound on its predicted outcomes is sufficiently low.
Otherwise, the overall performance of the program is indeterminate. Much as a definitive answer to the 29 evaluation problem may be desired, we must emphasize that there is no escape from the ambiguity of the situation.
We must also point out that the discussion of Section 3 considered a simpler one-stage evaluation problem than the two-stage problem faced by the BHE in comparing performance-based QUE renewal with baseline non-competitive funding. The discussion of Section 3 would apply fully if the BHE were comparing the indefinite funding version of QUE with baseline non-competitive funding. In that case, performance standards would need to be applied only at the macro level described in Decision Another is that evaluation of block grant programs like QUE requires integrated micro evaluation of individual grantees and macro evaluation of the funding mechanism.
Regardless of the specific evaluation criteria to be applied, planners must confront the fact the outcomes of interest are not observed. The outcomes under program A --mean life-cycle earnings under the QUE program --may not be observed until many years after the evaluation. The counterfactual outcomes under program B --mean life-cycle earnings under the baseline alternative --will never be observed. An evaluator, confronted with the auxiliary and counterfactual outcomes problems, should combine the available data with credible assumptions on treatments and outcomes. Given this information, the performance of a program may be deemed acceptable, unacceptable or indeterminate.
Suppose that an evaluation yields an indeterminate finding about the program's acceptability. What then? There are potentially two ways to resolve the ambiguity. One can always impose stronger assumptions. One can sometimes collect richer auxiliary outcome and/or historical data.
It is tempting to impose assumptions strong enough to yield a definitive finding. Whereas data collection can be costly and time-consuming, imposing assumptions requires only a leap of faith. The problem, of course, is that strong assumptions may be inaccurate and yield flawed conclusions. Even if an evaluator personally considers an assumption to be plausible, he must be concerned about the credibility of his findings to policymakers and the public. These may be a diverse group some of whose members may not share the evaluator's beliefs about what are and are not plausible assumptions. The evaluator must keep in mind that the weaker the assumptions imposed, the more widely credible are the reported findings. Let us face the fact that imposing assumptions that are not credible does not eliminate the ambiguity in the evaluation problem.
If stronger assumptions are not imposed, the only way to resolve an indeterminate finding is to collect richer outcome data. We have examined the evaluation problem given specified data, without saying anything about how these data came to be available. In practice, evaluators play a role in determining what outcome data should be collected. Evaluators may be able to influence the collection of historical data on auxiliary outcomes and outcomes of interest, thus enabling application of the ideas developed in Sections 3.1.
Evaluators may also be able to influence the collection of outcome data in program A, thus reducing the It is important to stress that an indeterminate finding does not imply that the planner should be unwilling or unable to make decisions. It only implies that the planner should not claim that his decisions are optimal.
